We build a simple model to study service fee competition between an incumbent and an independent ATM deployer, and its optimal regulation. We use the model to analyze an actual regulation of such a market by competition authorities in Finland. We …nd that socially optimal …rst-best fees would imply negative pro…ts for the independent deployer, calling for a Ramsey regulation. While the Finnish regulation pushes the foreign fee downwards towards its socially optimal level, the regulated fees are likely to remain too high from the welfare point of view. In contrast with the actual regulation, it would be essential to regulate the independent deployer's interchange fee, as the incumbent deployer internalizes the e¤ect of its foreign fee on consumer usage of the rival's network and has little incentive for foreclosure.
Introduction
The Finnish Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) market was long dominated by a monopoly deployer owned by the major Finnish banks. The use of cash at the daily point-of-sale transactions has been declining relatively fast, and the incumbent deployer was cutting back its ATM network. In 2008, however, an independent ATM deployer (IAD) entered the market and several other IADs were poised to enter. The subsequent competition resulted in a peculiar ATM service fee structure that attracted interest by the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA). In its decision of 2009 the FCA caps the foreign (on-other's) fee charged by the incumbent deployer but leaves other fees unregulated.
In this paper we build a simple model to study service fee competition and its optimal regulation in an ATM market where an incumbent deployer encounters an IAD. We then compare the optimal regulation suggested by our model with the actual regulation implemented by the FCA. While our model is insipired by the Finnish case, our analysis and results ought to be of more general interest:
The ATM industry poses challenges for regulators and competition authorities around the world, as neither free competition nor an unregulated monopoly protected from entry is likely to yield socially optimal outcome in ATM markets. The ATM industry is also of inherent interests to Central Banks given their statutory duty to ensure smooth operation of payment systems. For that reason, for example, the Reserve Bank of Australia also acts as the regulator of the Australian ATM market, and in 2009 it implemented.a major ATM fee reform that eliminated foreign and interchange fees.
More generally, the way cash supply is organized is not trivial: Schmiedel, Kostova and Ruttenberg (2012) estimate that the social costs of providing retail payment services are almost 1% of GDP in Europe, but cash has on average the lowest costs per transaction.
In our model we take some key institutional features of the Finnish ATM market as given and analyze the welfare consequences of competition as it emerged in the market. In particular, we assume that networks are technologically compatible, the incumbent deployer does not charge an on-us fee for consumer use of its own network, nor does the IAD surcharge. While the model is parsimonious, it yields a number of striking predictions. For example, it predicts that the IAD's equilibrium market share will be around 1/8. The model further suggests that the incumbent deployer internalizes the e¤ects of its foreign fee on consumer usage of the IAD's network. As a result, the incumbent has little incentive to set a high foreign fee to foreclose the IAD. Nonetheless, unregulated competitive fees are unambiguously too high from the welfare point of view, calling for regulated lower fees. It turns out that the socially optimal …rst best fees would not allow the IAD to balance its budget. We therefore also characterize the optimal Ramsey (second best) regulation.
Our model suggests that the fees stemming from the FCA decision are likely to be higher than both the …rst and second best fees. In contrast with the FCA's focus on the foreign fee, our model suggests that it would be essential to regulate the interchange fee. To obtain the …rst best it would su¢ ce to regulate the interchange fee alone. The second best outcome would be reached by regulating both foreign and interchange fees simultaneusly. If the direct and opportunity costs of a withdrawal from the incumbent ATMs were roughly zero the second best outcome would be realized by setting both fees equal to the cost of a withdrawal from the IAD's ATMs. If we assume that the interchange fee cannot be regulated, the FCA decision does involve an attractive feature as it makes the cap on the foreign fee contingent on the level of the interchange fee. Thus the reaction of the incumbent deployer should be taken into account when setting the interchange fee. Yet, the FCA decision could imply that the incumbent deployer does not balance its budget.
As ATMs consitute a di¤erentiated product industry with primary characteristics being location of machines, we use a spatial competition framework, which has been extensively used to study by the Australian regulatory reform, consider the welfare e¤ects of various ATM pricing schemes in a spatial competition framework. They study bank-owned deployers and IADs, accounting for consumers'need for other banking services than ATMs. Our model is simpler than theirs: in our model the incumbent and the IAD are similar save for the verticial di¤erentiation of their machines and the fee used as the strategic variable. They do not however consider the fee structure nor optimal regulation we focus on.
The interchange fee in an ATM industry has received a lot of attention by both regulators and academics (for regulatory interest, see, e.g., the Cruickshank Review, 2000; for academic literature, We di¤er from prior research by focusing on the setting of the interchange fee by an IAD rather than whithin a shared network.
Two important limitations should be acknowledged at the outset. First, as mentioned above, we abstract from modeling basic banking services and their pricing. The results of Massoud and Berthardt (2002) suggest that banks set high account fees but charge minimal on-us fees. This equilibrium appears to characterize the Finnish banking service market and we take these features as given. Second, we do not consider ATM operators'deployment incentives. Prior research (e.g., Donze and Dubec 2010) suggests that lower service fees might discourage ATM deployment, and optimal regulation should take this e¤ect into account. We hope our work will stimulate future research on the optimal regulation of ATM service fees when ATM deployment is endogenous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the key characteristics 4 of the Finnish payment media and ATM market. We develop the model in Section 3, and study the optimal regulation in Section 4. In Section 5 we use the results of Section 3 and 4 to evaluate the decision of the FCA. Conclusions are in Section 6.
Institutional Environment

Payment media market
The Finnish market for payment media is relatively advanced, for Finns have for some time now relied on accessing electronic payment networks at the point-of-sale (see, e.g., Amromin and Chakra- The Finnish market for payment media is concentrated, because the few main deposit banks that dominate the banking sector are the main issuers of payment media. The pricing of payment media, and the ways of providing them with customers tend to be similar across the issuers, at least after controlling for the banking relationships of consumers. At least one ATM or payment card is often automatically attached to a banking account as a part of a banking service package.
The packages can include various payment media, whose pricing hence depends on the pricing of the banking service packages. If a payment card is not a part of the service package, an annual fee is charged. Consumers rarely face transaction fees for using a payment medium, and withdrawing cash from ATMs was free (with the exception of credit card withdrawals) until the entry of the new ATM operator. Also, all banks have kept withdrawing cash from one's own account free. 
The development of ATM network
The …rst ATMs were introduced in 1971. The …rst network was operated jointly by the banks. Automatia has been cutting back the coverage of the ATM network over its entire existence.
There were 1655 ATMs in Finland at the end of September 2012, which is a low number by European standards even in relation to population.
Competition
Up to 2008 Automatia operated as a monopoly, but in March 2008 Eurocash Finland Plc (a subsidiary of Kontanten Plc, a large independent Swedish ATM deployer) entered the Finnish ATM market by introducing its own ATMs (labelled as "Nosto") associated with R-kiosk outlets (which are roughly similar to 7-Eleven outlets). The plan was to introduce more than 500 new machines.
At the same time two other IADs announced their plans to enter to the Finnish ATM market.
In particular, Suomen Käteisnosto Plc, owned by high-pro…le Finnish businessmen, announced a launch of an independent ATM network in co-operation with First Data Corporation, a major player in retail payment infrastructure and data processing market in the US. However, the plans of the other entrants have failed to materialize so far. Similarly, Eurocash has failed to expand its network according to its initial plans -there were only 42 Nosto-ATMs in Finland at the end of September 2012.
That competion has remained more limited than what was thought at the time of entry might be due to fees on the use of entrant's ATMs levied by the banks using Automatia's services and issuing payment cards.These fees consisted of a …xed amount of one euro per trasaction plus a variable amount ranging from 0.75% to 2% (depending on the bank) of the value withdrawal. The 7 introduction of these foreign fees prompted Suomen Käteisnosto to …le a complaint to the FCA.
We study the FCA's decision in the matter in more detail in Section 5. In what follows we focus on service fee competition between the incumbent, Automatia, and the sole entrant, Eurocash. 1 Eurocash's stated rationale for the entry is that there are too few ATMs in Finland, and it aims at giving the consumers easy and secure access to cash and to be present in high tra¢ c locations in Finland. The R-kiosk chain, with which Eurocash closely coperates, calculates that having an ATM in a store will increase sales.
There are di¤erences between the business models of Automatia and Eurocash. As the incumbent Otto.-network is owned by the major banks that also issue other payment media besides cash, the incumbent's goal is not necessarily to maximize the pro…ts from the use of its own machines.
In contrast, Eurocash is an IAD supplying only cash to consumers and is not involved in issuing other payment media. This di¤erence in business models shows up in the incumbent's and IAD's strategies to price the ATM use.
From consumer point of view, the pricing strategies are relatively simple but, in the case of the IAD's Nosto-machines, not necessarily transparent. 2 Contracts between banks and Automatia do not restrict the banks'service fee setting. However, no bank charges their cardholders for the use of Otto.-ATMs, i.e., the on-us fee is zero. 3 But, as mentioned, the banks charge their customers for using Eurocash's Nosto-ATM network, i.e., there is a positive foreign fee. Since the IAD is not issuing cards, it does not have members of its own. The IAD is not charging customers for the use of its Nosto-ATMs, i.e., Eurocash does not surcharge. But the IAD charges an interchange fee, i.e., Eurocash receives payments from banks according to their cardholders'use of Nosto-machines.
Besides business models, ATMs themselves are rather di¤erent between the rival networks. They have di¤erent colors and user interfaces. Thanks to a di¤erent user interface and rapidly increaseing number of fraud cases associated with the use of the incumbent's Otto.-machines, the IAD's Nostomachines may be perceived to be more secure to use by consumers. Because of these security concerns, Automatia has been upgrading its Otto.-machines from the beginning of 2012. Moreover, the incumbent's machines distribute only EUR 20 and EUR 50 notes whereas IAD's machines also allow for withdrawals of EUR 10 notes.
A Model of Di¤erentiated ATM Network Competition
In this section we build a model of service fee competition between two di¤erentiated ATM networks that employ di¤erent pricing stratetegies and ATMs, taking the institutional features of the Finnish ATM market as given (see the previous section). Consider two networks indexed i = O; N that compete for a unit mass of consumers that are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line. The networks are technologically compatible but network O is operated by card issuing banks while network N is an IAD. In other words, network O is the sole issuer of ATM cards. 4 Following the market practice in Finland, we assume that network O does not charge an on-us fee nor does network N surcharge. As a result, the sole pricing variable used by network O is a foreign fee, i.e., the price network O charges for the use of ATMs of network N . Similarly, network N can only obtain revenues by receiving interchange fee payments from network O for the use of its ATM machines. Note that because network O issues all cards, surcharges by network O and on-us and foreign fees by network N are immaterial. We also abstact from banks'account fees, and wholesale fees levied by network O on card issuing banks. 5 For simplicity, it is assumed that each consumer makes just one withdrawal and hence the number of consumers is a proxy for the number of transactions. The utility of a typical consumer who obtains cash from an ATM operated by network i; i 2 fO; N g, is
where M i denotes the incremental utility received by each consumer from using an ATM of network i, t is the unit travelling cost (disutility of not getting cash immediately) and x i is the distance from a consumer's location to the nearest ATM of network i. As shown by (1), we allow the networks' ATMs be vertically di¤erentiated: A consumer may receive a di¤erent incremental utility depending on the network from which the consumer withdraws cash.
It is assumed that M i , i 2 fO; N g, is su¢ ciently large so that in equilibrium market is fully covered. Thus the marginal consumer is indi¤erent between the two networks. Such indi¤erence requires that
where f is a foreign fee charged by network O for the use of network N 's ATMs. Since consumers are uniformly distributed on the line, we have x O = 1 x N . Therefore (2) can be rewritten as
where M M N M O captures the di¤erence between the service quality of network N 's and O's ATMs. Note that the quality di¤erence can be either positive or negative. We postpone the discussion of an empirically plausible sign of M to the end of this section. Equation (3) gives the demand function of network O's ATM services. Analogously, the demand function of network N 's services is given by
Let c i denote the cost an ATM withdrawal causes to network i 2 fO; N g and let a denote the interchange (access) fee paid by network O to network N . The pro…t function of network O can then be written as
In the right-hand side of (5), the second term comes from the net pro…ts derived from cash withdrawals of network O's cardholders from the rival's network. The …rst term captures the net costs The pro…t function of network N is given by
which shows how network N obtains revenues from interchange fees and encounters costs from withdrawals of its ATM machiness. In our case it is reasonable to assume that c N > 0, since the use of network N 's machines only involves direct costs to the network. international Visa and MasterCard fall-back rules that are more di¢ cult to change than networks' usage charges. We look for subgame perfect equilibria, solving the game backwards.
In stage two, network O chooses foreign fee f to maximize (5), taking the interchange fee as
given. The …rst-order condition 6 is given by
Since @X O =@f > 0, an increase in the foreign fee increases (decreases) the demand for network O's (N 's) services, as some consumers shift from network N to network O. The …rst term in (7) 6 Second-order conditions hold for all maximization problems in this paper.
captures the costs caused to network O by increased use of its machines (these may be positive or negative as discussed above). The second term shows how the shrinkage of network N 's demand is costly from network O's point of view, as the use of network N 's ATMs generates pro…ts to network O. The last term depicts marginal revenues from a higher foreign fee.
Using (3) to solve (7) for f gives In stage one, network N chooses interchange fee a so as to maximize (6) taking into account (8) . The …rst-order condition reads as
In (9), the …rst term comes from @ N =@f (df =da) and shows how an increase in the interchange fee prompts network O to raise its foreign fee due to strategic complementarity of the fees, which decreases the demand for network N 's ATMs (as @X N =@f < 0 by (4)). The second term captures 13 the marginal revenues of the increased interchange fee. Using (4) and (8) to solve (9) for a gives
Substituting (10) for (8) yields
where c c N c 0 depicts cost di¤erence between network N 's and O's machines. Like service quality di¤erence M , the cost di¤erence can be either positive or negative. 7 We postpone the discussion of the sign of cost di¤erence to the end of the section.
Equation (10) shows, in line with a standard Hotelling's model, that equilibrium interchange fee a c increases if the relative service quality of network N improves or costs of ATM withdrawals irrespective of the network increase. While equilibrium foreign fee f c is also increasing in the rival's costs, it is decreasing in the own costs and in the relative service quality of network O (see (11) ). However, this is intuitive upon recalling that network O wishes to encourage the use of rival network (at least for c O 0). As usually, both unregulated equilibrium ATM prices are increasing in travelling costs.
Substituting (11) for (3) and (4) yields the equilibrium market shares of the two networks:
and
As is intuitive, network O's equilbrium market share is decreasing in the service quality di¤erence and increasing in the cost di¤erence. The reverse applies for network N 's market share. Note that the network N 's market share is non-negative only if
From (10) we also see that if (14) holds, a c c N , implying non-negative pro…ts for network N's (see (6) ). In what follows we assume that (14) holds.
By substituting equilibrium fees (10) and (11), and equilibrium market shares (12) and (13) for the pro…t functions of the networks (5) and (6), equilibrium pro…ts can be written as
In words, the pro…t of network N is decreasing in the cost di¤erence and increasing in the service quality di¤erence as one could expect. Perhaps surprisingly the pro…ts of network O is also increasing in the service quality di¤erence and decreasing in the cost of withdrawing from network N 's machines. But again, the result is explained by the fact that the network O derives revenues from the use of network N 's ATMs. Also, under (14) the pro…ts of the network O are decreasing in its own cost. Besides assuming (14) , guaranteeing that N 0, we also assume that O 0, i.e., that
holds. Note that (17) imposes a more stringent restriction on parameters than (14) for c O > 0; whereas (14) binds for c O 0:
As (12)- (16) Assuming that the opportunity costs of providing ATM services are approximately zero, M c can be thought of capturing relative e¢ ciency of network N 's and O's ATMs. As a result, (12) and (13) Even if network O is enjoying a high market share its pro…ts may be (much) smaller than the pro…ts of network N . As shown by (15) and (16), a su¢ cient condition for this is that the net costs of ATM withdrawals borne by network O are positive (c O 0). In that case, network O's smaller pro…ts are unsurprising given that it is charging no on-us fee and is then making losses from cash withdrawals from its own machines.
Welfare and Regulation
Social welfare generated by the ATM duopoly is given by
The …rst and second term on the right-hand side of (18) depict the consumers'gross utility from cash withdrawals from network O's and N 's ATMs, respectively, and the third and fourth term capture the costs associated with ATM use (consumers'travelling costs to the nearest ATM and the costs of withdrawals incurred by networks O and N ). As (18) shows, welfare does not directly depend on the fees, since they merely represent transfers between consumers and networks. Welfare, however, indirectly depends on the fees as they a¤ect how the market is shared between the networks, i.e., the fees a¤ect X O (recall that X O is increasing in f which in turn is increasing in a in equilibrium).
To derive a socially optimal foreign fee, we maximize (18) with respect to f . Using Leibnitz's rule this yields
Solving ( If f is …xed at an arbitrary level, the question of an optimal interchange fee is moot as a a¤ects welfare only via f . Hence seeking the optimal interchange fee makes sense only if we let f to be determined by f (a) as given by (8) : Setting f (a) equal to f and solving for a yields
The expression for the socially optimal interchange fee a is somewhat more complicated but makes sense. As an interchange fee discourages the use of network N due to the strategic complementarity of the fees, the interchange fee should be increased if service quality or cost e¢ ciency of network O improves with respect to network N . If the service quality and cost di¤erences roughly cancel out each other (as might be the case in our institutional environment), the optimal interchange fee is simply given by the di¤erence between the cost of a withdrawal from the network N 's machine and the unit travelling cost.
Comparing unregulated fees a c and f c from (10) and (11) to the socially optimal fees a and f as given by (21) and (20), respectively, shows that under (14) the unregulated fees are too high from the welfare point of view. This is not suprising given that the networks have local market power, are vertically di¤erentiated, and use asymmetric pricing strategies. We summarize the above results in the following proposition. Let us now consider the regulation of the fees. In principle, the policy maker could regulate either foreign fee or interchange fee or both. While the rule for the optimal foreign fee ( (20)) is appealingly simple, the model suggests that there is little rationale to regulate the foreign fee alone without regulating the interchange fee simultaneously. Too see this, note that if the foreign fee is regulated at some …xed and …nite level but network N is allowed choose the interchange fee freely, the interchange fee will be "as high as possible": when choosing the interchange fee network N does no longer need to take into account the response by network O. As a result, the interchange fee could be so high that network O would be driven out of the market.
Regulating both fees yields socially optimal outcome if the fees are set to a and f . However, the model suggests that everything that can be achieved by regulating foreign and interchange fee jointly can also be achieved by regulating interchange fee only: if the interchange fee is set to the optimal level a , network O would choose the optimal forereign fee f automatically. But there is a problem with the regulation of the interchange fee, too: With the welfare-maximizing interchange fee a ; network N does not balance its budget since (14) implies that a < c N .
We next maximize social welfare with the constraint that both networks at minimum balance their budgets. This Ramsey problem is to choose a and f so as to maximize (18) subject to O (f; a) 0 and N (f; a) 0. After substituting (3) and (4) for (5), and observing (6) ; the non-negativity constraints O (f; a) 0 and N (f; a) 0 can be rewritten as
and a c N :
Solving the Ramsey problem where a and f are chosen to maximize (18) subject to (22) and ( 
Proof. i) Assume …rst that (22) does not bind. Then the …rst-best foreign fee (20) is optimal.
Substituting c for f in (22) yields after straightforward algebra
Note …rst that (14) implies that c N 2c 0 t= (t + M c) c N only if c 0 0: Then, from (23) and (24) it is evident that any a 2 [c N ; c N 2c 0 t= (t + M c)) satis…es both (22) and (23) with f = c. Since, for a given f , a constitutes just a transfer between networks without a¤ecting the demand, choosing any a 2 [c N ; c N 2c 0 t= (t + M c)) yields the same welfare. Clearly, under c 0 0 and (14); a c N a : (23) and (24) imply that there exists no a that would simultaneously satisfy (22) ii) If c 0 > 0, part i) implies that (22) must bind at an optimal solution. Hence we get that the second-best foreign fee must satisfy
which can be rewritten by means of (8) as
We proceed under the assumption that the term in the square root is non-negative and verify later that this is indeed the case. It is straightforward to show that even the lower root of the above equation is larger than f = c when (23) holds. This together with the concavity of welfare function in f implies that the lower root yields higher welfare. We have
Di¤erentiating (25) with respect to a gives
Now df (a) =da > 0; if the term in the square-brackets is strictly positive. A su¢ cient condition for this is that f (a) t M 0 which, after substitution of (8), is equivalent to
Note next that because c 0 > 0, (22) can hold only if f (a) > a: By using (8), f (a) > a is equivalent to t > a + c O M: As c 0 > 0, this imples that (26) holds. Hence we know that df (a) =da > 0: Again, since f (a) > f and since welfare is decreasing in f for f f ; we want to choose as small f as possible without breaking the constraints. This implies that also (23) holds as an equality. Inserting a = c N into (25) yields after some algebra
Finally, the term in the square root is positive under (17).
To gain understanding of implications of Proposition 2, let us consider the special case (which is not implausible in our case) where c O is zero. Then Proposition 2 implies that f = f = a = c N .
In words, both fees should be set equal to the cost of a withdrawal from network N 's machines.
Such regulation would internalize the cost di¤erence between networks'machines, while keeping the foreign fee as low as possible and allowing both …rms to operate in the market.
5 Analysis of the FCA' s decision would not mean that the second best optimum coud be obtained by regulating the foreign fee at f and leaving the interchange fee unregulated. Rather, it would mean that the optimal second best regulation would be feasible by regulating the interchange fee at a c and the foreign fee at f :
More generally, our model suggests that it would be essential to regulate the interchange fee, in contrast to the FCA decision. Recall that equation (7) shows that the incumbent deployer internalizes the e¤ects of the foreign fee on the consumer usage of the entrant's network, and as a result, the incumbent has little incentive to foreclose IADs. To obtain the …rst best it would su¢ ce to regulate the interchange fee alone: by regulating the interchange fee at a = a , the foreign fee would automatically be set at the socially optimal level in market equilibrium. The second best outcome would be reached by regulating both foreign and interchange fees at a level that results in zero pro…ts for both deployers. If the cost of withdrawals from the incumbent ATMs were roughly zero the second best outcome would be realized by setting both fees equal to the cost of withdrawals from IADs'ATMs. Nonetheless, a useful feature of the FCA decision is that the cap on the foreign fee is made contingent on the level of the interchange fee. Thus the interchange fee cannot be arbitrarily high as the reaction of the incumbent deployer should be taken into account when setting the interchange fee.
Conclusion
The Finnish ATM market was long dominated by a monopoly owned by the major Finnish card issuing banks. The use of cash at the daily point-of-sale transactions has been declining, and the incumbent deployer was cutting back its ATM network. In 2008, however, an IAD entered in the market and several other independent deployers were poised to enter. The resulting ATM service fee structure led to an investigation by the FCA. In its decision the FCA caps the foreign fee charged by the incumbent deployer but left the other fees unregulated.
In this paper we build a simple model to study the competition and regulation in an ATM market that takes some main characteristics the Finnish institutional environment as given. We …nd that unregulated duopoly competition yields too high service fees from the welfare point of view. We then characterize the socially optimal …rst best fees and show that they would not allow an IAD to balance its budget. We then characterize the optimal Ramsey regulation, and compare the optimal fees with the fee structure arising from the FCA regulation. In sum, our model suggests that while the FCA decision goes to a right direction by pushing the foreign fee downwards towards the socially optimal level and by tying the cap on the foreign fee with the level of the interchange fee, it is suboptimal to regulate the foreign fee alone. Therefore the fee structure resulting from the FCA decision is likely to remain too high from the welfare point of view. In contrast with the FCA decision, our model suggests that it would be essential to regulate the interchange fee, as the incumbent deployer internalizes the e¤ects of its foreign fee on the consumer usage of IADs'network and has little incentive to foreclose IADs. Since the FCA decision caps the foreign fee but leaves the interchange fee unregulated, it could imply that the incumbent network does not balance its budget.
While our analysis is inspired by the insitutonal environment of the Finnish ATM market our 
